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Private Rights of Action Against Foreign Entities
Under the United States Mineral Leasing Acts
by Robert G. Berger*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he spate of attempted takeovers of domestic mineral lease-holding
and mineral producing corporations, including those specializing in
energy-related minerals, by foreign entities during the last two years1, has
* Associate, White & Case; Clerk, Chief Judge Theodore R. Newman, Jr., District of
Columbia Court of Appeals (1979-80); J.D., Harvard (1979).
1 A widespread concern with regard to the rapid growth in foreign direct investment in
all sectors of the American economy led to passage of the Foreign Investment Study Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974)(authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to
prepare a report to Congress concerning foreign direct investment in the United States) and
the International Investment Survey Act of 1976, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3101-3108
(1976)(authorizing ongoing, regular and comprehensive data collection with respect to for-
eign direct investment in the United States). See generally Hearings on Foreign Investment
in the United States Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. (1974); Andrews, An Evaluation of the Need
for Further Statutory Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 147 (1974); Bernard, Foreign Investment in the United States: Is America
for Sale?, 12 Hous. L. REv. 661 (1975); Finkelstein, Stock Transfer Restrictions on Alien
Ownership Under Delaware Law, 38 Bus. Law. (1983); Heleniak, Restrictions on Foreign
Investment: Developments in United States Law, 3 J. CoMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 330
(1981); Levinson, Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate: Federal and State
Regulation, 12 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 231 (1980); Marans & Phillips, Federal Restrictions
on Foreign Direct Investment in Energy Resources, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNrED
STATES 471 (Marans et al. ed. 1980); MORRISON & KRAUSE, STATE AND FEDERAL LEGAL REGU-
LATION OF ALIEN AND CORPORATE LAND OWNERSHEP AND FARM OPERATION (Agricultural Eco-
nomic Report No. 284, May, 1975); Wilson, Foreign Investment: Investment Disclosure Re-
quirements, 22 HARv. INT'L L. J. 694 (1981).
Indicative of the spur to this rising concern is the fact that by the end of 1977 foreign
direct investment, defined to mean foreign ownership of 10 percent or more of the voting
securities of a United States corporation, had increased to 34.1 billion dollars, or approxi-
mately 11 percent over 1976. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
"Survey of Current Business," VoL 58, No. 8, Aug. 1978, at 39, as cited in De Vos, Foreign
Entities Investing in the United States, 37 N.Y.U. INST. 23-1, 23-2 (1979). In fact, in 1980,
a further step was taken with the passage of the Foreign Investment in Real Property Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2682, which regarded investment in real property in the
United Sates as effectively connected with United States trade, i.e., as if the taxpayer were
engaged in trade or business within the United States during the taxable year and as if such
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raised important questions concerning the potential foreign control of
U.S. mineral resource industries. The purpose of this article is to discuss
any potential rights of action a domestic corporation may have against a
foreign entity under the Mineral Leasing Act of 19202, the Mineral Leas-
gain or loss were effectively connected with such trade or business. This Act ended the abil-
ity of foreign holders of United States real property to avoid payment of capital gains on
disposal. Allen, Regulating Foreign Investments in the United States, 125 SOLIC. J. 838
(1981). The 1980 Act effectively should serve as a de facto barrier to, and sanction against,
further foreign direct investment in this country. It is interesting to note for purposes of this
article that, under the terms of the Act, 'real property' is defined to include interests in
mines, wells, or other natural deposits, as well as in any domestic corporation. Id. at 839.
2 Mineral-Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 146, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (1920), codified at
30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 provides in pertinent part-
Deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, oil shale, native asphalt, solid
and semi-solid bitumen, and bituminous rock ... or gas, and lands containing
such deposits owned by the United States... shall be subject to disposition in
the form and manner provided by this Act to citizens of the United States, or to
associations of such citizens, or to any corporation organized under the laws of the
United States, or of any State or Territory thereof or in the case of coal, oil, oil
shale, or gas, to municipalities. Citizens of another country, the laws, customs, or
regulations of which deny similar or like privileges to citizens or corporations of
this country, shall not by stock ownership, stock holding, or stock control, own
any interest in any lease acquired under the provisions of this Act.
30 U.S.C. § 181 (emphasis added to the 'reciprocity' clause). Section 189 of the Act further
provides: "The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to prescribe necessary and proper
rules and regulations and to do any and all things necessary to carry out and accomplish the
purposes of this Act. . . ." The Secretary of the Interior is provided with general authority
over public lands by virtue of 43 U.S.C. § 1457. The Commissioner of the General Land
Office (Director of the Bureau of Land Management) or a designated officer is provided with
the authority, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, to perform all executive
duties generally pertaining to the administration of the public lands by virtue of 43 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 1201, and 60 Stat 1100.
There are two primary enforcement provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Sec-
tion 184 (h)(1) provides:
If any interest in any lease is owned, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by means
of stock or otherwise, in violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the lease
may be canceled, or the interest so owned may be forfeited, or the person so own-
ing or controlling the interest may be compelled to dispose of the interest, in any
appropriate proceeding instituted by the Attorney General. Such a proceeding
shall be instituted in the United States district court for the district in which the
leased property or some part thereof is located or in which the defendant may be
found.
And, Section 188(a) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise herein provided, any lease issued under the provisions of this
Act may be forfeited and canceled by an appropriate proceeding in the United
States district court for the district in which the property, or some part thereof, is
located whenever the lessee fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Act,
or the lease, or of the general regulations promulgated under this Act and in force
at the date of the lease; and the lease may provide for resort to appropriate meth-
ods for the settlement of disputes or for remedies for breach of specified condi-
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ing Act for Acquired Lands3, and the Mining Law of 1872.4 This article
will also discuss whether in the alternative, a mandamus action 5 may be
brought against the Secretary of the Interior or the Attorney General in
order to compel such officials to enforce the provisions of the applicable
laws concerning alien ownership or control of mineral leasing rights in the
United States. Laws which previously had lain relatively dormant for as
long as a century have suddenly taken on a new importance in the new
and rapidly developing economic and industrial configuration of the
United States. Particularly where a mineral-oriented firm is faced with a
quick-moving, capital-laden foreign takeover bid, the previously men-
tioned acts may appear to provide the most potent sanctions and defenses
tions thereof.
Compare 30 U.S.C. § 184(a) and Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963)(affirming author-
ity of Secretary of Interior to cancel, in an administrative proceeding, a lease of public lands
issued under the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 in circumstances where such
lease was granted in violation of the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, i.e., was
void from inception); Winkler v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1980); Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Andrus, 498 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1980).
- Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, Pub. L. No. 382, ch. 513, 61 Stat. 913 (1947),
codified at 30 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.. The Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands provides
that lands administered thereunder "may be leased by the Secretary under the same condi-
tions as contained in the leasing provisions of the mineral leasing laws, subject to the provi-
sions hereof," thereby incorporating the 'reciprocity' provision of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920.
Regulations contained at 43 C.F.R. §§ 3102.2, 3502.1-1(a)(1970) implement the limited
proscription against alien ownership of mineral lease rights contained in 30 U.S.C. §§ 181,
352. Section 3102.2 provides:
[Oil and gas] leases or interests therein may be acquired and held by aliens only
through stock ownership, stock holdings and stock control; and only if the laws,
customs or regulations of their country do not deny similar or like privileges to
citizens or corporations of the United States. (Emphasis added).
Section 3502.1-1(a) similarly provides:
Aliens may not acquire or hold any direct or indirect interest in permits or leases
[involving minerals other than oil or gas], except that they may own or control
stock in corporations holding permits or leases if the laws of their country do not
deny similar or like privileges to citizens of the United States. If any appreciable
percentage of the stock of a corporation is held by aliens who are citizens of a
country denying similar or like privileges to U.S. citizens, its application will be
denied. (Emphasis added).
4 Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872), codified at 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq:
All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both sur-
veyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by
citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to
become such, under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local cus-
toms or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are
applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States. (Emphasis
added).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1962).
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against such attempts. Alternatively, the threat of such legal actions theo-
retically could provide a significant impetus for foreign states such as Ca-
nada, with its highly restrictive Canadian Oil and Gas Act (COGA),6 to
allow reciprocal7 entry of American corporate interests into their own
mineral and energy-related industrial establishments.8
The fact that foreign takeovers of such U.S.-based mineral giants as
Conoco and St. Joe Minerals have fallen short in the last two years may
prove to be of little comfort in light of the successful acquisitions that
have occurred throughout the 1970's. For example, the French Govern-
ment-controlled corporation, Elf Aquitaine, has acquired control of the
largest sulfur resources in America.9 Standard Oil of Ohio is controlled by
the British Government through its instrument, British Petroleum;
through Standard Oil, the British in turn control Kennecott Copper, the
largest U.S. copper producer.10 Similarly, in 1975 a French-controlled
6 This Act was originally introduced on December 9, 1980 in the House of Commons as
Bill C-48, 1st Sess., 32nd Parliament, 29 Elizabeth II, 1980. Canada had previously adopted
its Foreign Investment Review Act of 1973, 2 Eliz., ch. 46 (Can.)(FIRA) which provides for
governmental review and approval of all foreign acquisitions of 50 percent or more of the
voting stock of Canadian enterprises. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 166-167.
Ironically, the original version of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, introduced in the
Senate on August 15, 1919, by Senator Smoot of Utah, provided for a complete exclusion of
aliens from leasing rights under the Act. It was only in reaction to concern that such a
complete ban would engender "retaliatory action against America's investors in foreign
countries" that the 'reciprocity clause' was substituted by the House and later passed into
law. See H. REP. No. 398, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); similarly, see 58 CONG. REc. 4167-68
(1919)(remarks of Senator King). At the same time, the reciprocity clause was intended to
offset concern that "foreign control of domestic corporations operating a lease under the act
would result in large exportations of oil, coal, and other minerals covered by the act...
thereby deplet[ing] the domestic supply," by providing that U.S. citizens "could largely off-
set such a result by their own operations in foreign countries. . . ." H. REP. No. 398, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). Furthermore, it was also intended to provide the same protection to
U.S. citizens as foreign citizens already received in their own nations, some of which, such as
Great Britain, had previously limited ownership of their public domain lands to their own
citizens. See, e.g., 58 CONG. REc. at 4162, 4169 (remarks of Senator Phelan); id. at 7529
(remarks of Senator Sinnot).
* Of major American trade partners, Japan, France and Canada have the most restric-
tive policies with respect to foreign direct investment. For example, in Japan, virtually all
direct investment by aliens requires governmental sanction from the Ministry of Finance
and other competent ministries. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 163-165. France has rules
much the same as Japan: prior governmental approval is required for all foreign direct in-
vestment, including investments made by French companies under foreign control and
French branches of foreign corporate entities. Id. at 165-166. With respect to Canada, see
supra note 6.
By contrast, West Germany and the United Kingdom have far more liberal access poli-
cies. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 169-173.
T. White, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF, 424 (1982). See generally K. CROWE, AMEmCA
FOR SALE (1980).
10 T. White, supra note 9, at 424-425.
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chemical company purchased property in central Florida for phosphate
mining.11
Historically, control of a state's mineral resources has been recog-
nized as critical to the national well-being of that state.12 Only recently,
however, has the national impact of foreign control over critical domestic
mineral resources begun to be recognized as stemming from sources other
than the mere physical exportation of minerals. The problem of mere
physical exportation is easily perceived and remediable.1 s The far more
important impact of foreign direct investment concerns decision-making
responsibility with respect to significant and strategically critical sectors
of the domestic economy. Furthermore, control of major natural resource
interests can, and has been shown to translate directly into, major politi-
cal influence in the corridors of the Capitol and White House. 14 Finally,
in times of true national danger, crisis or international conflict, there is a
question of the reliability, cooperation and flexibility of decision-making
when major, strategically-critical industries are controlled by foreigners
with potentially different (if not antipathetic) vested interests and/or are
being managed from afar.
In short, the need exists, first, for a sanction against foreign restric-
tions on U.S. investment overseas; second, for a "reverse-sanction" which
would serve as an incentive for foreign nations to liberalize their policies
' Levinson, supra note 1, at 232.
" Such considerations were at the heart of the original Senate exclusion of all alien
leasing rights in the 1920 Act. Those concerns, as expressed by Senator Smoot of Utah, the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Public Lands, were that: "[U]nless it [the total bar]
is incorporated in the law the result will be serious to our own country and its control of the
oil produced in it. All men know that the control of the oil in a country means a control of
the commerce of that country." 58 CONG. Rxc. 4112 (1919).
There was also the related concern that an alien securing such a lease might decide not
to work the lease:
[I]f an alien secures a lease upon valuable oil properties in this country we desire a
provision which will compel him to work them or which will allow us to work them
when the oil is needed. That is the prime object of this provision, as I understand
it after conversation with my colleagues--that no alien should be allowed to ac-
quire property and then refuse to work it, or any way hamper the production or
have the power to work it and take the oil out of this country if it were needed
here.
58 CONG. REC. 4160 (1919)(remarks of Senator Fall).
Is As the drafters of the final version of the 1920 Act themselves recognized: "[I]f an
acute situation ever developed, a general embargo against exportation would be a sufficient
remedy." H. REP. No. 398, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). Similarly, at least some contempo-
rary commentators have made the erroneous assumption that Presidential authority to con-
trol exports to prevent a drain on scarce resources by virtue of the Export Administration
Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-13, is sufficient to resolve any problem. See, e.g., Bernard,
supra note 1, at 684 n. 205. In fact, imposing any such embargo itself may be a most difficult
political and diplomatic act, despite the appearance of authority.
"' See, e.g., White, supra note 9, at 424-425.
1983
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
on foreign direct investment; and third, for a security safeguard vis-a-vis
continued domestic control of strategic natural resources. Private rights
of action under the Mineral Leasing and Mining Acts potentially offer
such a combined sanction, incentive and safeguard.15
Part I of this article reviews those cases which have implicated the
right of aliens to own or control mineral leases obtained pursuant to the
aforementioned acts. Part II discusses the availability of a writ of manda-
mus against either the Secretary of the Interior'6 or the Attorney General
of the United States. 17
II. RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL BY ALIENS
In Isaacs v. De Hon'8 the defendant sought to avoid his obligations
under a grubstake agreement in an oil claim and a prospecting permit on
the basis that plaintiffs were aliens and therefore not allowed under the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 to hold such a permit. In rejecting the defen-
dant's argument, the court reasoned:
If the plaintiffs are aliens, appellant is in no position to take advan-
tage of this circumstance. No one but the sovereign has any right to com-
plain of a trust in real estate in favor of an alien disqualified to hold title.
Such a trust is valid until, at the instance of the government, the alien-
age is judicially established. 9
15 Other superficially strong barriers and disincentives for such foreign direct invest-
ment exist by virtue of the U.S. securities, tax, and antitrust laws. By virtue of foreign
corporations' increasing willingness to retain and rely on U.S. counsel knowledgeable with
such legal problems, however, such barriers are more apparent than real. See De Vos, supra
note 1; Young, The Acquisition of United States Businesses by Foreign Investors, 30 Bus.
LAw. 111 (1974); Young, The Acquisition of United States Businesses by Overseas Inves-
tors, Bur. TAx Rsv. 339 (1973).
" Pursuant to his or her duties under 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 187, 189.
" Pursuant to his or her responsibilities under 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 184(h)(1).
1 Isaacs v. De Hon, 11 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1926).
19 Id. at 944 (citations omitted). The court went on to state: "The Secretary of the
Interior would not have been a proper party to this suit. The courts will not interfere by
mandamus or injunction with his performance of his duties under the public land laws.
Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S. 473, 475, 25 L.Ed. 800."
Recovery Oil Co. v. Van Acker, 79 Cal. App. 2d 639, 180 P.2d 436 (1947) involved a
situation where a lessee holding interests in an oil lease under the 1920 Act, assigned a
portion of his rights to a second party. These rights eventually came to be assigned to the
defendants. The lessee later assigned all of his-remaining rights to Recovery Oil. The assign-
ments to defendants were never filed in the appropriate district land office of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, as provided for by regulation and statute. Recovery Oil brought suit to
quiet title and claimed all rights to the land, on the basis that regulation provided that
permits could not be assigned except "to qualified persons or corporations upon first ob-
taining consent of the Secretary of the Interior." The court, in finding against Recovery Oil,
relied on Isaacs in stating that "These and similar laws and regulations against assignments
have been before the courts numerous times. It is the established rule that they are for the
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Osterman v. Baldwin,20 relied on by the court in Isaacs, was a very
early case concerning an alien-plaintiff who, in contravention of the con-
stitution of the independent state of Texas, had purchased Texas prop-
erty. The plaintiff had created a trust in one of the defendants in order to
circumvent the prohibition; this defendant later transferred the property
to another defendant. The court stated:
It is true, as the defendants insist, that when the purchases were
made by Baldwin, Texas was a foreign country, with a constitution for-
bidding aliens to hold real estate. But the defendants cannot object on
that ground. Until office found,' Baldwin was competent to hold land
against third persons. No one has any right to complain in a collateral
proceeding if the sovereign does not enforce his prerogative. This court,
in Cross v. De Valle, [1 Wall. 8] says: 'That an alien may take by deed, or
devise, and hold against any one but the sovereign, until office found,' is
a familiar principle of law, which it requires no citation of authorities to
establish.2'
Osterman did not implicate any of the Mineral Leasing Acts with
which this article is concerned, predating each of the acts. However, the
principles established in Osterman have been cited repeatedly in support
of the proposition that only the sovereign, as opposed to private parties,
has a right of action to void lease or permit rights acquired under the acts
on the basis that the holder is an alien.
For example, in Manuel v. Wulff,22 two claimants to a quv.tz lode
mine discovered upon U.S. land sought the right to file for an appropriate
land patent in the local federal land office pursuant to the Mining Act of
1872. One of the two claimants, Moses Manuel, held his right under a
deed granted by the original locator; while the locator was an American
citizen, Manuel had been an alien until shortly before judgment was ren-
dered. The Court stated:
[W]e are of opinion on this record that, as Alfred Manuel was a citizen, if
his location were valid, his claim passed to his grantees, not by operation
of law, but by virtue of his conveyance, and that the incapacity of the
latter [defendant] to take and hold by reason of alienage was, under the
circumstances, open to question by the government only. Inasmuch as
this proceeding was based upon the adverse claim of Wulff to the appli-
cation of Moses Manuel for a [land] patent, the objection of alienage
benefit and protection of the government. Their prohibition can only be raised by the sover-
eign, is 'available only to the government' and 'is not available to an individual'." 180 P.2d
at 438 (citations omitted). While Recovery is not an 'alien' case itself, it reaffirms the princi-
ples there involved.
20 Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall. 116, 121-22, 73 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1867).
21 Id., 73 U.S. at 121-22.
22 Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505 (1894).
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was properly made, but this was as in right and on behalf of the govern-
ment, and naturalization removed the infirmity before judgment was
rendered.
2 3
Manuel presents two important points. First, it reinforces the conclu-
sion that only the sovereign may challenge a holder's land claim on the
basis that the holder is an alien. Second, the language italicized in the
quotation above suggests that, contrary to the holding in Isaacs, a private
party may in fact be competent to raise a challenge based on citizenship
at least where it is done "in right and on behalf of the government." This
suggestion is reinforced by dictum contained in O'Reilly v. Campbell.24
O'Reilly involved an action to determine the validity of the plaintiff's
adverse claim to a portion of mining land covered by the defendant's sur-
vey and plat. The action arose under the Mining Act of 1872. On appeal,
the defendant attempted to put the plaintiff's citizenship into issue. The
Court stated:
It is true that the mineral lands of the United States are open to
exploration and purchase only by citizens of the United States, or by
those who have declared their intention to become such; and had the
objection been taken in the court below that such citizenship of the
plaintiffs had not been shown, it might, if not obviated, have been fatal.25
Taken in conjunction with Manuel, O'Reilly provides further support for
the inference that, contrary to Isaacs, individuals may raise the question
of a rival leaseholder's citizenship in an action between private parties.
The later case of McKinley Creek Mining Co. v. Alaska United Min-
ing Co.2 6 reaffirmed the basic holding of Manuel without satisfactorily
resolving the question of whether in fact a private party could attack, at
least on behalf of the government, an individual's land claim based on
citizenship. McKinley Creek involved a "bill in equity brought by the ap-
pellee company [Alaska], who [sic] was plaintiff below, to establish title
to two placer mining claims against a like claim of appellant company to
the same ground." 27 In the course of its opinion, the Court explicated and
reaffirmed its Manuel decision: "The meaning of Manuel v. Wulff, is that
the location by an alien and all the rights following from such location are
voidable, not void, and are free from attack by any one except the
government. '28
The Court, in reaching its conclusion, explained the rationale behind
23 Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
O'Reilly v. Campbell, 116 U.S. 418 (1886).
25 Id. at 420.
26 McKinley Creek Mining Co. v. Alaska United Mining Co., 183 U.S. 563 (1902).
27 Id. at 563.
28 Id. at 572.
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Manuel and its current holding-
In Manuel v. Wulff, this court sustained the validity of a conveyance
of a mining location to an alien, reversing a decision of the Supreme
Court of Montana to the contrary. The decision was based upon the dif-
ference between a title by purchase and title by descent, and the doctrine
expressed that an alien can take title by purchase and can only be
divested of it by office found. The case of Governeur v. Robertson, 11
Wheat. 332, was cited and approved, and the remarks of Mr. Justice
Johnson in that case become apposite....
I copy it from Bacon, not having had leisure to examine the
authority which he cites for it: "Every person," says he, "is supposed a
natural born subject that is a resident in the kingdom and that owes a
local allegiance to the king, till the contrary be found by office." This
reason, it will be perceived, applies with double force to the resident who
has acquired of the sovereign himself, whether by purchase or by favor, a
grant of freehold.'
That grantees of the public land take by purchase this court, in Ma-
nuel v. Wulff, left no doubt. It was said that when a location is perfected
it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present
and exclusive possession.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of
who may attack an individual federal mining lease interest on the basis of
citizenship since McKinley Creek. Isaacs is the only case which applies
the holdings of those cases decided pursuant to the Mining Act of 1872 to
the more recent Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. As previously noted,30 the
Mining Act of 1872 did not contain a reciprocity provision similar to the
one contained in the 1920 Act.31 Furthermore, there is only one case di-
29 Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
3o See supra note 2 and 3, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 352.
1 It is important to note, however, that unlike the later Mineral Acts, under the Min-
ing Act of 1872 "the citizenship necessary to participate in such purchases apparently is
defined so as to include corporations chartered domestically but having alien stockholders."
Elmer & Johnson, Legal Obstacles to Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Corporations, 30 Bus.
LAw. 681, 696 (1975), explicating Doe v. Waterloo Min. Co., 70 F. 455 (9th Cir. 1895). In Doe
the court held:
In considering the question of jurisdiction in the federal courts, it is established
that, when a corporation organized under state laws is a party, it is conclusively
presumed that the stockholders thereof are all citizens of that state. Muller v.
Dows, 94 U.S. 445. Congress was familiar with this rule, and it seems probable
intended to establish a similar rule under the mineral land act of 1872. The prac-
tice in the United States land office has been, I think, universal not to require of a
corporation seeking to patent mining ground proof of the citizenship of its stock-
holders, other than by the production of a certified copy of articles of incorpora-
tion. * * *It would have been a great hardship on a corporation to have had to
prove that all of its stockholders were citizens of the United States. The practice
1983
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rectly implicating the reciprocity provision of the 1920 Act.3 2 Accordingly,
the same rationale underlying the proscription against a private party at-
tacking an individual's leasehold claim on the basis of citizenship appar-
ently would apply with equal force to an attack on an indirect corporate
holder.
One potential line of attack does remain open, however, and may
present a viable alternative to a direct action by a domestic corporate
entity as a private party qua private party against a foreign entity. It has
already been suggested that Manuel and O'Reilly leave unresolved the
question of whether a private party is competent to raise a challenge
based on citizenship in right and on behalf of the government. Although
the O'Reilly dibtum arguably might support a direct private right of ac-
tion, Manuel, McKinley Creek, and Isaacs seem to foreclose such an op-
tion. Neither McKinley Creek nor Isaacs, however, addresses the alter-
in 'the land department of the United States under this statute should have great
weight in construing it.
Id. at 463.
32 No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981) involved the construction
of an oil pipeline from Port Angeles, Washington to Minnesota. Plaintiffs claimed that
Northern Tier Pipeline Company (NTPC) was ineligible to hold the requisite right-of-way
permit across federal land, necessary for construction, which had been issued under the 1920
Act, 30 U.S.C. § 185(a). Plaintiffs' claim was predicated on the fact that 26 percent of
NTPC was owned by Western Crude, Inc.; that in turn Getty Oil owned 100 percent of
Western; and that ultimately the government of Kuwait owned 200,000 shares of Getty.
Accordingly, plaintiffs argued that NTPC was ineligible to hold the permit as it was owned
by foreign citizens of a "non-reciprocating" country. The court held, first, that all companies
involved were corporations organized under the laws of the various states. Second, that Ku-
wait did not own an interest in the permit by stock ownership, i.e., it did not hold any
NTPC stock directly. Third, Kuwait could not be charged with indirect control by virtue of
its stock holding, as its small, fractional share of Getty had not been shown to invest Kuwait
with such control. And fourth, in dictum, the court, citing Isaacs, stated: "[I]t appears un-
likely that plaintiffs have standing to raise the issue. It does not appear that plaintiffs' in-
jury, if any, is 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated' [by § 181
of the 1920 Act]." 520 F. Supp. at 360.
The dictum in No Oilport! merely serves to reinforce the discussion and conclusion
presented above.
Ironically, plaintiffs' claim with respect to Kuwait has been borne out by subsequent
events. For the first time in the 63-year history of the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act, the De-
partment of the Interior has barred citizens of a foreign nation, i.e., Kuwait, from owning an
interest in the covered federal mineral leases. During the week of March 11, 1983, Interior
Secretary James G. Watt declared Kuwait, to be a "non-reciprocal nation." Interior Dept.
Bars Kuwaitis From U.S. Mineral Holdings, Washington Post, Mar. 11, 1983, at A18; Ku-
wait Barred from U.S. Federal Mineral Leases, Reciprocal Limits on Oil Cited, 7 U.S. IM-
PORT WEEKLY 768-69 (Mar. 16, 1983). Secretary Watt, however, based his decision on a ques-
tionable and controversial iiterpretation of the 1920 Act, in as much as he held Kuwait to
be nonreciprocal because it discriminated specifically against the U.S., not all foreign coun-
tries. The Act clearly does not make a distinction as to whether a foreign nation's lack of
reciprocity is across the board or, like Kuwait, specifically targets the United States.
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nate option suggested by O'Reilly and Manuel. While to date no one has
attempted to exploit that option, several of the recent corporate takeover
situations have presented highly attractive settings in which this alter-
nate option might have been raised for the first time.
Each of the early grubstake cases presented a simple situation where
two or more frontier miners sought to establish claim to a small lode or
vein. Each permit or lease application, and each assignment thereof, had
to come before the Secretary of the Interior for approval, pursuant to the
applicable regulations. In each case the government interest to be pro-
tected, as well as the private interest, was sufficiently de minimus that
there was no need to allow private parties an independent cause of action
in order to protect the sovereign. In fact, even in cases where assignments
were never submitted for approval, as required,3 3 the interests to be pro-
tected were not sufficiently major to require the finding of an implied
private right of action. In several of the recent situations, however, where
multibillion dollar-a-year corporations were involved, both overriding
governmental and private interests have been engaged and irreparably af-
fected before any governmental action was forthcoming under the appli-
cable mineral leasing acts. Furthermore, unlike the turn-of-the century
cases previously discussed, in several of the recent takeover situations,
the foreign entity involved would neither be applying for nor receiving an
assignment of mineral permits or leases. The ownership of the lease and
permit rights would technically continue to reside in the newly-acquired
U.S. domestic corporation for at least as long as it remained a separate
corporate entity, even if the entity was merely a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the foreign acquirer. As such, no transfer of rights would have taken
place and therefore, arguably, the transactions engendered by a tender
offer might never engage the registration and approval requirements of
the applicable federal regulations.' Accordingly, the sovereign technically
may never have reason to know of potentially illegal foreign ownership
and control of domestic mineral leases and permits. The fact that by stat-
ute and regulation the sovereign automatically was made aware of all
lease applications and assignments partially underlay the rationale of the
early mining cases which, at this time, provide the sole judicial interpre-
tation of the mining and mineral leasing acts. A limited argument can be
made for an implied private cause of action under the reciprocity provi-
sions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the Mineral Leasing Act for
Acquired Lands, especially in light of: the option left open by both Ma-
nuel and O'Reilly for a private party to sue on behalf of the government;
the amount of time which has passed since the last of the mineral leasing
cases was decided by the Court; the massive public and private interests
33 See, e.g., Recovery Oil v. Van Acker, 79 Cal. App. 2d 639, 180 P.2d 436 (1947).
- 43 C.F.R. Parts 3100, 3500 (1981).
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which may be irreparably affected by the takeover of a major domestic
mineral- or energy-based corporation by a foreign national; and the inap-
plicability of the normal registration and approval regulations to the
modern takeover case.
III. MANDAMUS ACTIONS To COMPEL GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
An action for writ of mandamus brought by a domestic corporation
to compel either the Secretary of the Interior or the Attorney General 5 to
take steps to prevent a foreign entity from acquiring a domestic corpora-
tion on the basis that the acquirer's own country does not accord recipro-
cal treatment for holders of mineral lease rights, must be taken pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Section 1361 provides: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel
an officer or employee of the United States or agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff." In order for an action for mandamus to lie:
the implicated officer must owe a 'clear duty' to the plaintiff; the plaintiff
must have a clear right to relief; the action to be compelled must not lie
within the officer's 'zone of permissable discretion'; and another adequate
remedy must not be available.36 Mandamus is not precluded, however,
solely because judicial construction is required to clarify the duty sought
to be enforced.37
The question of whether mandamus will lie against the Secretary of
the Interior has been addressed several times in the context of the Mining
Act of 1872 and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. The seminal case of
Marquez v. Frisbies concerned a suit by plaintiff to compel the Depart-
ment of the Interior to reverse its decision finding in favor of defendant's
claim and denying plaintiff's claim as pre-emptor of a certain quarter sec-
tion of land. Plaintiff argued that the officer of the Department who made
the decision had misapplied the law of the case, and that the decision had
been obtained by fraud. The Court stated: "We have repeatedly held that
the courts will not interfere with the officers of the government while in
the discharge of their duties in disposing of the public lands, either by
injunction or mandamus." e Once a final decision has been made and title
to the patent has been vested, mandamus will lie only in clear cases of
mistake or fraud.
The right to a writ of mandamus, therefore is carefully circum-
scribed. Relying on Marquez, the court in Witbeck v. Hardeman ° de-
35 Pursuant to his or her duties under 30 U.S.C. § 184(h)(1).
" Ramirez v. Weinberger, 363 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. 111. 1973), affd, 415 U.S. 970 (1974).
37 Rosati v. Haran, 459 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
38 Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S. 473 (1879).
30 Id. at 475.
4' Witbeck v. Hardeman, 51 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1931).
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clared that. the courts would not interfere with the patent issue function
of the Land Department. Witbeck involved an action to enjoin an alter-
nate applicant for a prospecting patent for oil and gas under the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920, and to judicially establish plaintiff's own right to a
prospecting patent. The court held that mandamus would lie only if, hav-
ing previously decided that the land should be exploited, the Secretary
should then refuse to issue a permit in contravention of the plain man-
date of the law.
41
Two points can be derived from Marquez and Witbeck. First, the
courts will not compel a governmental officer to reach a certain decision
while the question is still being subjected to investigation. Second, once
the decision has been made, the courts will only compel its reversal if the
judgment was obtained by fraud or if it is clearly in contravention of the
statutory mandate.
In light of the above discussion, it must be considered whether a do-
mestic corporation, targeted for a foreign takeover and holding mineral
leases or permits on federal lands, would have an action for mandamus
against either the Secretary of the Interior or the Attorney General. The
mandamus would be to enforce the reciprocity provisions and alien own-
ership clause of the three mineral leasing and mining acts.
First, is the domestic corporation owed a clear duty by virtue of the
reciprocity clauses of the two mineral leasing acts?42 To the extent that
only the sovereign is entitled to challenge a person's possession, control or
ownership of the covered mineral leases and permits, the answer must be
"No." If the reciprocity clause is solely for the benefit of the government,
then no action of mandamus would lie. However, if an implied private
right of action is found to exist, then perhaps it can be argued that a clear
duty is owed. Nevertheless, unless such a private right is broader than
one simply taken "in right and on behalf of the government," mandamus
most likely would not be found to lie.43
41 Id. at 451-52. By contrast with Witbeck, an action for mandamus was held to have
been properly brought in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1967), where an applicant for oil and
gas leases on 25,000 acres of land in Alaska, pursuant to § 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior to reverse his decision denying the
applications. The question presented concerned whether the lands had been closed to the
public at the time when the successful applicants had submitted their claim. The Bureau of
Land Management had considered the two competing applications, had decided who was
entitled to the leases, and had issued them. While the Supreme Court found that the Secre-
tary had not been in error, there was no question that an action for mandamus had been
taken properly by plaintiffs.
42 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 352 (1976).
43 It is important to note, however, that certain portions of the original Senate debate
over the 1920 Act strongly suggest that Congress was concerned over the impact on U.S.
stockholders of the "reciprocity" clause and that a duty running to private parties was in
fact intended. So, for example, Senator Walsh pointed out that-
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Second, is some other adequate remedy available? Once the Secre-
An American corporation with stockholders all of whom are Americans
secures a lease upon a property. They expend their money and develop it, are
successful, and secure oil. They look for a market for their oil, find a foreign mar-
ket, and sell their oil under a contract to a foreign State or to the nationals of
another country, as they are entitled to do. The law does not forbid them to do so
at all, and they find an opportunity to make a profitable contract of that charac-
ter, but some of their stock gets upon the market; it is dealt in on oil exchanges,
and eventually a portion of that stock gets into the hands of a national of another
country. Thereupon the Secretary of the Interior sends a notice to them that they
must not sell any more of their oil to the nationals of any foreign country and
commands that they immediately break their contract with the foreigner. It seems
to me that would be quite unfair.
58 Cong. Rec. 4166 (August 22, 1919). He then stated:
I should like to have you consider the matter from the standpoint of the original
American stockholders who went into the company. They are, let us say, ten in
number. They are all Americans. Their corporation is an American corporation.
They get this lease. They put their money into the development of the property,
and they get the property, and then they make the contract to sell, as they have a
right to do under law. Now, one of the stockholders dies and his stock is thrown
on the market in some way. Another is unfortunate, and his property is seized
under attachment, and it is sold. A third falls out with the rest of his associates,
and he finds an opportunity to sell his stock to a foreigner. Now, as I say, the
foreigner deserves his fate; but what about the seven original Americans?
58 Cong. Rec. 4166 (August 22, 1919).
Senator Sterling similarly noted that, with respect to the original version of the Act:
[I]t occurs to me that provisions are pretty severe on American interests in any
event, for it may by the power conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior oper-
ate to the disadvantage of American interests. The alien interest may be a very
small interest, insignificant, in fact, and yet because there is that small alien inter-
est the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to take possession and operate the
entire leased property.
58 Con. Rec. 4163 (August 22, 1919). In rebuttal, Senator Smoot noted:
The provision is that the Secretary of the Interior may require the sale. It does
not say that he shall, and I do not believe that any Secretary of the Interior in a
case like that would ever cancel the lease because of the mere fact that it did go
into the hands of a foreigner. All that could possibly happen is that when a for-
eigner purchased stock and the company found out that he was a foreigner, they
could say, "Here, we do not want to transfer this stock to you. We will purchase
back from you at the price that you gave for it."
58 Cong. Rec. 4167 (August 22, 1919). Taken together with the reasons for later incorporat-
ing the "reciprocity" clause, outlined supra note 7, a reasonable argument can be made that
Congress did in fact intend that private domestic stockholders benefit, and be owed a duty,
under the 1920 Act.
We would note that the 1947 Act for Acquired Lands merely incorporated the adminis-
trative provisions and intent of the 1920 Act. See H.R. 550, June 9, 1947 at U.S. Code Cong.
1661-1666 (1947).
The four-prong test for determining whether a private remedy should be implied from a
statute was first outlined in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The first prong of the Cort test,
whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"
impinges directly on the analysis set forth above. See Landry v. All American Assurance
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tary of the Interior has denied a petition to find that the foreign ac-
quirer's home country is no longer a nation granting reciprocal mineral
rights, arguably, no other adequate remedy would exist. At least with re-
spect to this provision, the tender offer would go forward, and if success-
ful, it would result in a major mineral lease holder or mineral producer
being controlled by a foreign entity.
Third, is the decision within the permissive zone of discretion df the
Secretary of the Interior or other responsible governmental officers? The
reciprocity provision of the 1920 Act44 is peremptory in nature. Unless the
alien's nation accords U.S. citizens reciprocal rights, the alien "shall not
by stock ownership, stock holding, or stock control, own any interest in
any lease acquired under the provisions of this Act." The same provision,
however, provides that such rights will be denied unless "similar or like
privileges" are extended by the alien's country to U.S. citizens. The gov-
ernmental officer making the reciprocal determination must look to the
foreign country's laws, customs, or regulations. The Secretary of the Inte-
rior and the Attorney General have dual responsibility for enforcing this
provision: the Attorney General by virtue of his or her responsibility
under Section 184 of the 1920 Act;45 and the Secretary of the Interior by
virtue of his or her responsibility under Section 189.46 While the provi-
sion 47 demands that a determination be made with respect to each impli-
cated nation, the use of the highly imprecise words "similar" and "like"
introduce a great amount of discretion into the decisions of the responsi-
ble officers. Unless the laws of the implicated nation are starkly drawn,
therefore, the judgment of the Secretary of Interior and of the Attorney
General most likely will be within the permissible zone of discretion by
definition.
Finally, does the domestic corporation have a clear right to relief?.
Briefly, just as a private party probably is not owed a "clear duty," so too
the corporation would not have a clear right to relief.
V. CONCLUSION
Although a private party currently will have, at best, a difficult time
making out any type of claim under the three mineral acts, it is impor-
tant that a new approach be considered. Just as the 1872 Mining Law,
Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 1065 (1982). The second prong of the test, the indication of congressional
intent, explicit or implicit, to create such a private remedy, is also called into question and
is normally dispositive of the issue. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979).
" 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
45 30 U.S.C. § 184 (1976).
46 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976).
47 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
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which "absorbed the mining customs of the Gold Rush customs adapted
to the scale and sophistication of small-scale mining,' ' s may be no longer
able to serve the realities of the modern day mining industry, the acts of
1920 and 1947, as presently interpreted, may be no longer able to serve
and police effectively the realities of modern international corporate
mergers. The three laws, in tandem, were passed in order to deal with the
problems of rival claims by individual prospectors, claims over rights to
small placer mines and claims to mineral lodes. The simple mechanisms
established no longer serve to protect the national interest in retaining
domestic control over its strategically important mineral and energy
resources.
A private right of action would greatly aid effective government pa-
trolling of leased mineral rights, while working to safeguard continued do-
mestic control over such vital resources. By giving recognition to those
interests most directly and immediately affected by a foreign takeover
(such as domestic private interests), the right to challenge takeovers by
foreign entities as being "nonreciprocal," a most effective, immediate
sanction would be made available to combat potential international trade
and economic opportunity imbalances.
The danger, however, is that the 1920 and 1947 Acts hinge on the
interpretation of the laws of the foreign acquirer's home nation as being
reciprocal or not. This is normally a sensitive political and diplomatic is-
sue, one which should not be entrusted to the vagaries of individual deci-
sions of the far-flung American judiciary. Determinations of this nature
have historically, and properly, been left to the Executive and Legislative
branches.49
48 Later, The 1872 Mining Law: A Statute By-Passed by Twentieth Century Technol-
ogy and Public Policy, 1981 UTAH L. RaV. 575, 582 (1981). With respect to the disjunct
between the prescriptions of the 1872 Act and the exigencies of modern mining, see Knut-
son & Morris, Coping with the General Mining Law of 1872 in the 1980's, 16 LAND &
WATER L. Rav. 411 (1981).
49 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304
(1936). Also, see Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp., 366 F.Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex.
1973), where, in the context of an American corporate takeover by a Canadian, governmen-
tally-controlled entity, challenged on public policy grounds, the court stated:
It is an issue of public policy and national interest as to the role multination-
als will play in the future, but this Court cannot decide generally in the context of
this case what this role may be. It belongs in the Legislature and Executive
Branches of government. This broad issue is too fraught with economic subtleties
and questions of delicate balances of trade, as well as problems of economic
reciprocity.
Id. at 419 (emphasis added). For an excellent critique of Texasgulf, see Hayes, Recent De-
velopments, 9 Tax. INT. L. J. 242 (1974); Parker, Recent Decisions, 8 VAND. J.'TRANs. L. 223
(1974).
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Perhaps the best remedy is to amend current decisional law, either
by statute or by judicial re-examination of the original Congressional in-
tent" to provide for a 'clear duty' owed by the appropriate governmental
officials (the Secretary of the Interior in conjunction with the Secretary of
State) to the domestic corporation threatened with a foreign takeover.
Such a clear duty might consist of the right to have a definite opinion
issued vis-a-vis the reciprocal nature of the acquirer's home nation,
within a specified time frame, during which the merger could not be
finally consummated. Such a public waiting period might be similar to
that provided for in antitrust situations under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act.5 1
The above suggested solution would have a threefold appeal. First,
the governmental need to maintain control over foreign acquisitions of
domestic mineral resources by creating a potent, privately-triggered sanc-
tion against non-reciprocal foreign takeovers would be furthered. Second,
at the same time it would serve to protect the interests of those domestic
stockholders who wish to retain their existing interests in the target
American company and who, after a successful takeover, might find
themselves possessed of a substitute equity interest in the successful ac-
quirer, which equity would be seriously jeopardized by the potential loss
of the valuable mineral leases acquired under the acts. Third, at the same
time, the problem of judicially-prescribed foreign policy, which would ex-
ist if direct private rights of action under the acts against foreign entities
were allowed to be entertained, would be avoided.
In sum, as the law now stands a domestic corporation probably does
not have an implied right of action against a potential foreign acquirer
under the three mineral leasing and mining acts, as a private party qua
private party. Second, a private right of action may exist when taken "in
right and on behalf of the government." Finally, it is doubtful whether an
action for mandamus would be found to lie against either the Secretary of
the Interior or the Attorney General to compel them to find that the alien
entity's home nation was not a "reciprocal" nation.52
Unless the official government bodies take the initiative in rapid in-
vestigation and enforcement of potential violations of the mineral leasing
acts during takeover situations, the most important and far-ranging ef-
fects of foreign control of federal mineral resources may escape analysis
and regulation. At the same time, domestic corporations seeking to de-
flect such foreign takeover attempts will be forced back into reliance on
50 See supra notes 7, 43. As previously noted, supra note 32, for the first time in the
history of the 1920 Act the Secretary of the Interior has declared a foreign country, Kuwait,
a 'non-reciprocal nation.'
8 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
8 See generally 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1971).
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the same basic matrix of options available in fights over domestic take-
overs. Given the growing number of such foreign takeover situations and
the critical nature of continued domestic control of our own mineral and
energy resources, it is time to re-examine the long dormant authority lim-
iting the application of the mineral leasing laws in private actions. There
is a far different economic and industrial situation today than that which
was in effect at the time the implicated acts were passed, when grubstake
claims were at the forefront of concern.
